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1. INTRODUCTION
Crawford v. Washington radically transformed the doctrine governing
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.'
Before Crawford, a prosecutor could introduce against an accused evidence
of a hearsay statement, even one made in contemplation that it would be
used in prosecution, so long as the statement fit within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception or the court otherwise determined that the statement was
sufficiently reliable to warrant admissibility.2 Crawford recognized that the
Clause is a procedural guarantee, governing the manner in which
prosecution witnesses give their testimony. Therefore, a prosecutor may
not introduce a statement that is testimonial in nature to prove the truth of a
matter that it asserts unless the accused has, or has had, an opportunity to be
confronted with the witness who made the statement.
Richard D. Friedman is the Alene and Allen F. Smith Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School.
1. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-60 (2004).
2. See id. at 42; accord Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541
U.S. 36.
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
4. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWiS & CLARK
L. REv. 733, 733-37 (2009). This principle is qualified only slightly: in some circumstances, the
accused may forfeit the confrontation right by wrongful conduct that prevents the witness from
testifying subject to confrontation. See id. at 734. And the Supreme Court has held open the possibility
that there is a dying-declaration exception to the right. See id. at 737. In my view, the dying-declaration
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Though this principle represented a fundamentally different way of
applying the Confrontation Clause, it did not have a pervasive impact on the
results of cases. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Crawford majority
pointed out explicitly that most of the results reached by the Supreme Court
in Confrontation Clause cases were consistent with the testimonial approach
to the Clause enunciated by Crawford.' I believe that is because courts and
rule makers had a sense, although not usually articulated and perhaps not
usually conscious, of the basic principle underlying Crawford-that a court
ought not admit a statement against an accused if doing so would
effectively allow the maker of the statement to testify out of court and
without confronting the accused.6
There are, however, some significant areas in which this principle had
become so obscured that pre-Crawford courts casually admitted testimonial
statements against criminal defendants.' Some of these have not given rise
to much controversy. Before Crawford, courts often admitted formal
statements, such as allocutions and grand jury testimony, made without an
opportunity for confrontation in prior judicial proceedings.9 Since
Crawford, though, courts have generally recognized that this is improper. 0
In two other areas, however, the effect of Crawford has been far more
contested and controversial, leading to repeated intervention by the
Supreme Court. One of these is fresh accusations-accusatory statements
made shortly after the commission of a crime, most often to a police officer
or some other law enforcement agent." Before Crawford, courts were often
very lax in admitting these statements, most often on the grounds that they
fit within the hearsay exceptions for excited utterances or present sense
impressions.12 In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court's first
Confrontation Clause decision after Crawford, eight Justices recognized
that many of these statements are testimonial in nature.13 Only Justice
Thomas declined to characterize an oral accusation made to a police officer
in the witness's living room as testimonial; he regarded the statement as
insufficiently formal to fall within the scope of the Clause.' 4 More recently,
in Michigan v. Bryant, a majority of the Court has taken a completely
cases are best explained as instances of forfeiture doctrine, if that doctrine is properly conceived. See id.
at 733-38.
5. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55-59.
6. See id. at 53-59.
7. See id. at 58-59.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 63.
10. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012).
11. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171,
1252-53 (2002).
12. See id. at 1178-79.
13. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Two cases were decided together in Davis-
Davis itself and Hammon v. Indiana. Id at 813. I represented the petitioner in Hammon. Id. at 815.
14. Id at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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different tack to loosen the strictures of the Clause in this area-a generous
reading of the doctrine first enunciated in Davis that if a statement is made
principally to respond to an "ongoing emergency," then it should not be
deemed testimonial in nature.' 5
The second controversial area, and the principal subject of this Article,
is forensic laboratory reports. Forensic science has become an increasingly
important and routinized aspect of our criminal justice system. In the years
before Crawford, many jurisdictions found it irresistibly tempting to allow
prosecutors to present the results of forensic lab tests by presenting reports
from the lab without the need for a live witness.' 6  Indeed, some states
passed statutes designed to permit and regulate this result." Absent such
special-purpose provisions, some jurisdictions determined that
confrontation, as well as hearsay concerns, could be satisfied by
characterizing lab reports as business or public records. 18
After Crawford, however, I believe it should have been obvious that a
forensic lab report created on the understanding that it would likely be used
as prosecution evidence is testimonial within the meaning of Crawford and
so subject to the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court so held in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, calling this conclusion a "rather
straightforward application" of Crawford.19 But Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito, wrote a pained
dissent. 20 Among them, the dissenters, the respondent Commonwealth, and
its supporting amici raised a slew of arguments21 that Justice Scalia, again
writing for the majority, methodically cast aside. It did not matter that the
lab reports, though they identified a substance as cocaine, could be
characterized as not accusatory or as akin to business records; that they
might (rather dubiously) be regarded as the product of neutral, scientific
testing; that the analysts who prepared the reports could be characterized as
not "conventional" or "ordinary" witnesses; or that the accused could have
subpoenaed the authors of the reports and made them his own witnesses if
he had so chosen.22 Nor did Justice Scalia put much stock in what he called
the dissent's "dire predictions" of disaster if lab analysts were required to
testify. 23 "Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall" as a result
of the decision, he wrote, "is that it has not done so already." 24 And, more
15. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154-56 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312-15 (2009).
17. See id at 325-28.
18. See id. at 324.
19. Id. at 312, 329.
20. See id. at 330-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 315 (majority opinion).
23. See id. at 327-28.
24. Id. at 325.
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fundamentally, "[W]e may not disregard [the Confrontation Clause] at our
-,,25convenience.
The Melendez-Diaz dissenters proved to be a resilient group. Four
days after the case was decided, the Court granted certiorari in another case
involving forensic lab reports, Briscoe v. Virginia.26 The grant appeared
strange because the basic issue raised by the petition-whether the
accused's ability to present the lab analyst as his own witness obviated the
need for the prosecution to present the analyst live-had, so it seemed, just
been resolved in Melendez-Diaz.27 There was widespread speculation that
the four dissenters were trying to undercut the case already: Justice David
Souter, a member of the majority, had announced his retirement, and Judge
Sonia Sotomayor, a former prosecutor, had been nominated to succeed
him. 28 But when the case reached oral argument, it became rather apparent
that the new Justice was not about to join the dissenters in overruling or
limiting a precedent that was just seven months old. 29 The Court did what it
should have done in the first place, vacating the decision of the Virginia
Supreme Court and remanding for proceedings consistent with Melendez-
Diaz.30
That was just round two. In both Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe, the
prosecutors had tried to get away with simply introducing a piece of
paper.' In the next case in the line, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the
32
prosecution introduced a live witness from the laboratory. The live
witness was not, however, the analyst who performed the test in question;
he had been placed on unpaid administrative leave for reasons that were
never revealed but that presumably did not lend credibility to his reports.33
Again, the case seemed easy to me; after all, Justice Kennedy had noted in
his Melendez-Diaz dissent that the Court had made clear that it "will not
permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into evidence
through the in-court testimony of a second."3 4 And a five-member majority
of the Court-again with a change of membership, this time Justice Elena
25. Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 427, 429-37
(2012) [hereinafter Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling] (summarizing Melendez-Diaz more fully).
26. See Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316-17 (2010) (per curiam). I represented the
petitioners in Briscoe.
27. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324-25.
28. See Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, supra note 25, at 432. Justice Scalia lent additional
force to the speculation when, during the oral argument in Briscoe, he suggested that the Court had
taken the case to consider overruling Melendez-Diaz. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58-59, Briscoe,
130 S. Ct. 1316 (No. 07-11191) ("Why is this case here except as an opportunity to upset Melendez-
Diaz? ... I'm criticizing us for taking the case.").
29. See Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, supra note 25, at 432.
30. See Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. at 1316.
31. See Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, supra note 25, at 429-33.
32. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709-10 (2011).
33. See id. at 2714.
34. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 334 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Kagan taking the place of Justice John Paul Stevens, who had retired-saw
it the same way. But the four Melendez-Diaz dissenters still resisted.36
After Bullcoming, it was not surprising that the Court soon took
another Confrontation Clause case involving forensic laboratory analysis.
But this latest case, Williams v. Illinois, was different in some crucial
respects from the earlier ones.37 And this time, the Melendez-Diaz
dissenters gained a crucial fifth vote from an unexpected source.
Williams arose out of an abduction and rape in Chicago.38 The victim,
referred to as L.J., did not know the assailant, who escaped from the scene
in his car.39 The police took a vaginal swab from L.J.4 0 After determining
that there was semen on the swab, the Illinois State Police (ISP) crime lab,
for reasons of convenience and speed, shipped it for DNA analysis to
Cellmark, a private forensic lab then operating in Germantown, Maryland.4'
Ultimately, Cellmark sent the swab back to the ISP, together with a report,
which was signed by two analysts, giving the profile of male DNA that it
stated had been found on the swab.4 2 Sandra Lambatos, a forensic scientist
at ISP, compared that profile to those in a computerized database that ISP
maintained.43 She determined that the profile matched that of Sandy
Williams, who had provided a DNA sample when he was arrested on an
unrelated charge several months after the assault on L.J." Though she had
previously mistakenly identified another man as the assailant, L.J. now
picked him out of a lineup, and he was charged with the crime.45
At trial, L.J. again identified Williams, but the prosecution relied
heavily on the DNA evidence.46 To link Williams to the crime through
DNA, the State had to prove three basic propositions: (1) that DNA of a
given profile was found on the vaginal swab; (2) that Williams had a given
DNA profile; and (3) that the two profiles matched-or, put more precisely,
that the probability of Williams's semen generating the profile found on the
swab was close to one and the probability of semen from any other given
male generating that profile was infinitesimally small.4 7 The State proved
the second of these propositions by presenting the live testimony of Karen
Abbinanti, a forensic scientist at ISP, who developed a DNA profile from
35. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-19.
36. See id. at 2723-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. See Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, supra note 25, at 434.
38. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2012).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 2229-30.
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blood drawn from Williams when he was arrested on the unrelated charge.48
The State presented this evidence in an unexceptionable manner, and
Williams did not object.4 9 And the third proposition, taken by itself, did not
pose a particular problem: Given DNA profiles yielded by two samples,
Lambatos could testify that they matched and what the probability would be
of such a match if they did not come from the same man.so
It was the first proposition that was more troublesome because the
prosecution did not present anybody from Cellmark to testify at trial."
Indeed, it did not even introduce the report into evidence.5 2 But Lambatos's
testimony explicitly referred to Cellmark's report of a profile of DNA found
on the vaginal swab, and it made very clear the critical fact about that
profile-that it was such that, as analyzed both by a computer program and
by her, it matched that of Williams.
Williams objected on Confrontation Clause grounds to Lambatos's
testimony, but the trial court, sitting without a jury, overruled the
objection.54 Williams was convicted, the Illinois courts affirmed the
judgment, and so ultimately did the United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4
vote."
There was no majority opinion. This time, Justice Alito wrote for the
four Melendez-Diaz dissenters, concluding that Williams's confrontation
rights had not been violated. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, wrote an opinion rejecting virtually every
substantive point that he made. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion
doing the same-but he nevertheless joined with the Melendez-Diaz
dissenters in concluding that the State had not violated Williams's
confrontation rights. 8 He did so solely on the rather surprising ground,
which the Alito foursome did not endorse, that the Cellmark report was not
sufficiently formal to be deemed testimonial.
I will now analyze the various arguments and factors cited in favor of
the result in Williams.
48. Id at 2229.
49. See id
50. See id. at 2230.
51. See id. at 2245.
52. See id. Nor was the report made a part of the record on appeal. See Richard D. Friedman, The
Cellmark Report, and What It Shows, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:43 AM),
http://www.confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/12/cellmark-report-and-what-it-shows.html
[hereinafter Friedman, Cellmark Report Blog Post]. Williams lodged a copy of the report with the
Supreme Court. See id
53. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2236.
54. Id. at 2223.
55. Id. at 2244.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 2264-75 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 2256-64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 2260-61.
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING ADMISSIBILITY
Crawford provides a categorical but narrow rule, subject to very
limited qualification: 60 If a statement is (a) testimonial in nature and
(b) offered by a prosecutor to prove the truth of what it asserts, then its use
is improper unless the accused has had or will have an adequate opportunity
to be confronted with the witness who made the statement. Justice Alito
concluded both that the statement was not testimonial in nature and that it
was not offered to prove the truth of what it asserted.6 Justice Thomas
agreed that the report was not testimonial, but only on a basis that the Alito
foursome did not share.62
A. A Testimonial Statement?
Justice Alito's opinion appears to attempt to create two requirements
for a statement to be deemed testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause: It must (a) have "the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual of engaging in criminal conduct," and (b) be "formalized." The
first of these standards, if adopted by the Court, would represent a stunning
constriction on the confrontation right. Five Justices properly rejected it.54
By contrast, the Court has previously spoken of a formality requirement,
though for good reasons it has not previously given such a requirement any
real force. In Williams, Justice Thomas, the Court's principal advocate of
the requirement, gave it unprecedented force.65 The Alito foursome, though
seemingly motivated to find any plausible way of concluding that the state
had not violated Williams's confrontation rights, did not join him in
declaring that the Cellmark report was insufficiently formal to fall within
the Clause; they did, however, take a sideswipe at a decision in which, just
six years ago, every member of the Court but Justice Thomas indicated that
66
a violation of the Clause was quite clear.
60. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 60 (2004). The rule does not apply if the
accused has forfeited the confrontation right, and perhaps there is a sui generis exception for dying
declarations. See id.
61. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
62. See id at 2260-61, 2264 (Thomas, J., concurring).
63. Id, at 2242 (plurality opinion). He contends that these two characteristics are shared by "[tihe
abuses that the Court has identified as prompting the adoption of the Confrontation Clause" and were
present in "all but one [Hammon] of the post-Crawford cases in which a Confrontation Clause violation
has been found." Id. (footnote omitted).
64. See id. at 2264 (Thomas, J., concurring); id at 2275 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
65. See id at 2260-61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. See infra Part 1.A.2.
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1. No Primary Purpose to Accuse a Targeted Individual
Justice Alito noted that the Cellmark report, unlike the statements in
the post-Crawford cases in which the Court has found a confrontation
violation, "plainly was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a
targeted individual." 67 This sentence seems to be attempting to establish
three components of a requirement for a statement to be deemed
testimonial.
(A) Accusation. An accusation test was already rejected in Melendez-
Diaz, and quite properly so. 6' The Confrontation Clause applies to all
"witnesses against" an accused. It is not, and cannot sensibly be, limited
to those who actually make an accusation.o If it were, then the right could
apply only to those witnesses who observe a crime-and in many cases
(including most murders) no such witness testifies. Imagine a case in which
Wanda testifies that she left Donald and Victor alone in a small room at
10:01 in the midst of a nasty argument; Wendy testifies that she came into
the room at 10:02 as Donald was leaving, saying, "Victor has been shot!"
and that she found a smoking pistol by the side of Victor's body; Whitney,
a forensic scientist, testifies that fingerprints on the pistol match a known
exemplar taken from Donald; and Wilma, another forensic scientist,
testifies that the pistol was the source of the bullet that killed Victor. None
of those witnesses have accused Donald of a crime; if the Confrontation
Clause were limited to accusations, each of them could testify against
Donald without confronting him-say, by making a videotape before trial.
This, plainly, has never been the law; if it were, the common-law criminal
trial would have had a very different appearance over the last 500 years.
(B) Targeted Individual. Justice Alito's opinion appears to be
suggesting that a statement cannot be testimonial, and so subject to the
Confrontation Clause, unless it is directed at "a targeted individual."n Such
a test has no more merit than an accusation test. As Justices Thomas and
Kagan pointed out, this test has no pedigree; it appears to be made up out of
thin air.7 2 Moreover, this test does not square easily with the language of
the Confrontation Clause. If a statement that would otherwise be
considered testimonial is offered against an accused at trial, without the
accused having an opportunity to be confronted with the witness who made
67. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243 (plurality opinion).
68. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009); see also Williams, 132 S. Ct.
at 2263 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing Melendez-Diaz's
rejection of the test).
69. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309.
70. See id. at 313-14.
71. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (plurality opinion).
72. See id. at 2262-63 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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the statement, it seems rather clear that the accused has not "enjoy[ed] the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."7 1
Consider this case: After a murder has been committed, and before a
suspect has been identified, a police officer visits the scene. She then
makes a videotaped statement that begins this way:
We do not yet have a suspect, but I am confident that eventually we will
identify the perpetrator of this crime. And when we do, the state will
prosecute that person. I may then find it inconvenient to testify at trial.
Accordingly, I am now recording this statement so that it may be
presented as evidence at trial.
Again, if the Confrontation Clause tolerated statements of that sort,
common-law trials would have been very different for centuries.
A targeted-individual test also would raise a host of ambiguities. How
tightly focused does the targeting have to be? If a witness tells police that
she saw a man running away from the scene of a crime to a red car, is that a
targeted individual? If not, suppose that she also says that the man was
6'5" tall and had red hair. Does that narrow the universe down sufficiently?
Presumably the name of a person is not the only identifying information
that will constitute targeting. Or suppose the witness provides a genuinely
unique description-oh, say, a 13-locus DNA profile unlikely to be shared
by anyone else on the planet-and indicates that the semen of that person
was found in a vaginal swab of the victim of a rape. Is that sufficient
targeting? What if the lab technician who performs a test on a drug sample
and reports on it has no idea of the identity of the suspect? Does that mean
that the statement is so untargeted that the Confrontation Clause is not a
concern, even though the police officer who requested the test knows who
the suspect is?
The one thing to be said for a targeted-individual test, I suppose-and
Justice Alito does say it-is that if a statement is not directed at a targeted
74individual then it is less likely to be the product of dishonesty. But so
what? That a statement may be reliable has no bearing on whether it is
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Moreover-though
given the context of the case the Cellmark report may have been highly
reliable-as a general matter, to say that a statement was not motivated by
the desire to frame a given individual does not guarantee that the statement
is reliable, for other possible sources of unreliability remain. A witness
may have an incentive to make it appear falsely that a crime has been
committed; more likely, perhaps, inaccuracy may result from misperception
or failure of memory. Five Justices in Williams rejected a targeted-
73. Id. at 2232 (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
74. Seeid at2243-44.
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individual test.7 5  I hope the Court as a whole buries it at the next
opportunity.
(C) Primary Purpose. Examining the "primary purpose" of the
statement has been a part of Confrontation Clause doctrine, for better or
worse, since the decision in Davis in 2006.76 In Williams, Justice Alito's
opinion asserts that the primary purpose of the Cellmark report "was not to
accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial."7 7 Thus, he seems to
be hedging his bets; even if the accusation and targeted-individual
components of his test are rejected, he is saying, the report still is not
testimonial because it was not written primarily to create evidence for use at
trial.78 Why not? The primary purpose of the ISP in requesting the report,
Justice Alito wrote, "was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large,
not to obtain evidence for use against [Williams], who was neither in
custody nor under suspicion at that time." 79 And as for Cellmark, no one
there "could have possibly known that the profile that it produced would
turn out to inculpate [Williams]-or for that matter, anyone else whose
DNA profile was in a law enforcement database."80
These assertions are quite dubious in two respects. First, distinguish
between the initial and ultimate purposes of the report. The initial purpose
of requesting, and furnishing, the report was certainly to identify, and then
catch, the perpetrator. But what then? In our system, perhaps it bears
reminding, catching the bad guy is not the end of the story: We have to put
him on trial, and to convict him requires evidence. The ultimate purpose
behind the report (and if one had to choose, I would say the primary
purpose) was to create evidence so that the perpetrator would not only be
identified but also be convicted and punished-in other words, given the
75. See id at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2264
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
76. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Justice Thomas's opinion in Davis, dissenting in
part, was sharply critical of the test. Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For criticism of the test from a very different vantage point, see Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis,
and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 553, 559-61 (2007): "[T]he decisive question in deciding whether a
statement is testimonial should [not] be one of 'primary purpose,' either of the declarant or of the state
agents." Id. at 559; accord Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision,
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/03/preliminary-
thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html (criticizing the elaboration of the test given in Bryant--evaluating
primary purpose from a mixed perspective of questioner and declarant). For a recent illustration of the
difficulties that the primary-purpose test can create, see United States v. Polidore, 690 F.3d 705, 715
(5th Cir. 2012) (holding that statements made by an anonymous 911 caller asking for a drug dealer to be
arrested at a later time were not testimonial, despite the fact that they were not made to relieve an
ongoing emergency-the caller's primary purpose was to provide information to lead to arrest, not to
provide evidence for trial).
77. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 2225.
80. Id. at 2243-44 (emphasis added).
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gravity of the crime, to ensure not only that he would be caught but also
that he would stay caught for a considerable period of time.
Second, distinguish between certain knowledge and anticipation.
Nobody at Cellmark (or at the ISP, for that matter) could know-in the
sense of having knowledge to a certainty-that the profile produced by
Cellmark would inculpate someone "whose DNA profile was in a law
enforcement database." 8' But certainly that was the hope and the entire
reason behind the report; indeed, if the profile produced by Cellmark did
not match a profile that was, then or later, known by some law enforcement
agency, then it is difficult to discern what possible good it could have done,
either to catch the perpetrator or to secure his conviction.
Once again, it is good to note that Justice Alito's opinion spoke for
82
only four Justices; the other five rejected his views in this respect.82 The
viewpoints of the Alito foursome do not reflect the law.
2. Formality
The idea that formality is a prerequisite for a statement to fall within
the Confrontation Clause appears to have entered the discourse on the
Clause in Justice Thomas's concurrence in White v. Illinois in 1992." That
was an important opinion; it was the first opinion in the Supreme Court to
suggest that the Clause is limited to a relatively narrow set of statements,
but that as to those statements it establishes a categorical rule.84 Moreover,
the test Justice Thomas suggested, that the Clause be limited to statements
"contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," certainly is on the right track,
in the sense that it describes a significant category-and probably the great
majority-of statements that should be deemed testimonial.85  But it is
unfortunate that in the two decades since White, Justice Thomas has not
moved beyond the position he staked out then; as a test for determining
whether a statement is testimonial, formality fails. Having argued the point
at length elsewhere, I will summarize it here.8 6
Some formalities-in particular, the oath or some suitable substitute,
presence of the accused, and an opportunity for cross-examination-are a
large part of what makes testimony acceptable. Without them, the
testimony is not satisfactory.87 Other formalities, such as the question-and-
answer format and the ceremonial nature of the courtroom, are desirable but
81. Id. at 2244.
82. See id at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring); id at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
83. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. See id at 364.
85. Id. at 365.
86. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L.
REv. 241, 266-69 (2005).
87. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 603.
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less essential. The absence of formalities, then, creates a problem, and
depending on the formality that is missing, the problem may be decisive.
The absence of formalities should not be a factor rendering the
Confrontation Clause inapplicable and, therefore, making it easier for the
statement to be admitted. If a statement is made in full knowledge that it
will be used as prosecution evidence-and to make it simple, let us assume
that both the speaker and an official inquisitor have this understanding and
that in fact their exclusive purpose in generating the statement is to achieve
that result-it would make no sense at all to say that the statement,
nevertheless, falls outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause because it
was made informally.
Part of the weakness of the formality test is indicated by Justice
Thomas's inclusion of confessions in his listing of formal statements.8 8 It is
obvious that A's confession to the authorities cannot be introduced against
B if B has not had an opportunity to be confronted with A; that has been the
law at least since Tong's Case in 1662.89 But if a confession is inherently
formal, it would seem a plain accusation should also be. That is, if A's
statement to the police "B and I did it" is necessarily formal, his statement
under identical conditions, "B did it alone" should be as well. But that is
not Justice Thomas's view.
In Hammon v. Indiana, decided as part of Davis, the Court held 8-1,
with only Justice Thomas dissenting, that Amy Hammon's oral statement to
a police officer, made in her living room and describing an assault allegedly
committed by her husband, was testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. 90 The Court acknowledged that the interrogation in
Crawford was more formal-it contained factors that "made it more
objectively apparent . . . that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down
the truth about past criminal events"-but the Court stated explicitly that
"none was essential to the point": "It was formal enough that Amy's
interrogation was conducted in a separate room, away from her husband
(who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his
'investigat[ion]. "91 What is more, the Court indicated that Hammon was an
easy case.92
Among the Justices who joined the majority opinion in Davis-
Hammon were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
88. See White, 502 U.S. at 361.
89. See Case of Thomas Tong, [1662] 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (stating that an out-of-court
confession may be used against the confessor but not against his alleged co-conspirators).
90. See Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 814 (2006).
91. Id. at 830 (alteration in original). In a footnote, the Court also said, "We do not dispute that
formality is ... essential to testimonial utterance. But ... [i]t imports sufficient formality, in our view,
that lies to [examining police] officers are criminal offenses." Id. at 830 n.5 (citations omitted).
92. See id. at 829 ("Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial character of the statements that
were the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a much easier task [than in the Davis case], since
they were not much different from the statements we found to be testimonial in Crawford.").
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Alito-that is, the four Justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming and signed on to the Alito opinion in Williams. And yet in
Williams, the foursome took an unsubtle and gratuitous swipe at
Hammon-on the grounds of formality.94 Using the formula originated in
Justice Thomas's White concurrence, they said that, except for Hammon,
every post-Crawford case in which the Court had found a Confrontation
Clause violation "involved formalized statements such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 95 Notwithstanding the
"formal enough" characterization in Hammon itself, the foursome said
explicitly that in Hammon, "an informal statement was held to violate the
Confrontation Clause."96
It probably was not surprising that Justice Alito would do what he
could to make Hammon appear vulnerable. Consider the concurring
opinions that he and Justice Thomas wrote in Giles v. California.97 That
case concerned the circumstances in which an accused forfeits the
confrontation right.9 8 The statements in question, like the one in Hammon,
constituted an oral accusation of domestic violence made to the police some
time after the incident occurred.9 9 The California Supreme Court had noted
on the basis of Hammon that there was "no dispute that the victim's prior
statements were testimonial in nature," 00 and so that issue was not before
the United States Supreme Court.' 0 ' Justice Thomas wrote a brief
concurrence noting that the statements at issue were "indistinguishable"
from those in Hammon, and so, though given the procedural setting he was
bound to treat them as testimonial, he did not believe they were. 02 Justice
Alito's opinion, though not quite so blunt, pointed in the same direction. 0 3
"[L]ike Justice Thomas," he wrote, he was "not convinced" that the
statements fell within "the scope of the confrontation right."'" He did not
attempt to reconcile this assessment with his vote in Hammon, and neither
did he question Justice Thomas's assessment that Giles and Hammon were
indistinguishable in this respect. 05 It may well be that Justice Alito's vote
93. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct.
2705, 2723 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009); Hammon, 547 U.S. at
815.
94. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243.
95. Id at 2242.
96. Id. at 2243.
97. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377-78 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 378
(Alito, J., concurring).
98. See id at 355 (plurality opinion).
99. See id. at 377.
100. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 438 (Cal. 2007).
101. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (plurality opinion) ("The State does not dispute here, and we accept
without deciding, that Avie's statements accusing Giles of assault were testimonial.").
102. Id at 377-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. Id
105. See id
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in Hammon resulted from the fact that it was the first term on the Court for
Chief Justice Roberts as well as for himself, and this was a "honeymoon"
period of relatively high consensus. 0 6
I was more surprised by the fact that three other Justices in Williams
joined in the snipe at Hammon. But perhaps I should not have been. The
Bullcoming dissent suggests that, though all three had concurred in
Crawford, they are suffering some buyer's remorse.'07 These Justices seem
willing to latch on to almost any argument with surface plausibility that will
limit the reach of Crawford. Indeed, I have called the foursome's
discussion of formality in Williams gratuitous because it had no bearing on
Williams itself but was apparently a seed sown for possible future
growth;108 Justice Alito did not, in fact, suggest that the Cellmark report
lacked sufficient formality to be considered testimonial.109
Perhaps they regarded that idea as outlandish. I do. "[I]t seems to
me," I wrote before the Court issued the Williams decision, "that simply
looking at the report demonstrates whatever degree of formality any
[J]ustice is likely to require for a statement to be considered testimonial.""o
That statement still seems substantively right to me, though I suppose I
should have said "any Justice but one."
But there is that one Justice. Though he disagreed forcefully with
virtually every point the Alito opinion made-making five Justices who
rejected those arguments-Justice Thomas nevertheless concluded that the
Cellmark report was not sufficiently formal to invoke the Confrontation
Clause."' It seems to me that this conclusion virtually makes a parody of a
bad idea.
Clearly, the report was made in contemplation of use in investigation
and prosecution of crime.112 Indeed, Justice Thomas acknowledged, it was
"produced at the request of law enforcement," though he said that "it was
not the product of any sort of formalized dialogue resembling custodial
interrogation."" 3 But why not? The evidence was sent under seal from ISP
to Cellmark, pursuant to their usual procedures.l 14 ISP documented the
shipping records that it kept in the ordinary course of its business "to
maintain a record of the chain of custody of evidence."' 15 Now, consider
106. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 23, 38-39 (2007).
107. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011). Note also Justice Breyer's
comment during the argument in Giles: "I joined Crawford, and Justice Scalia would like to kick me off
the boat, which I'm rapidly leaving in any event . . . ." Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Giles, 554
U.S. 353 (No. 07-6053).
108. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring).
110. Friedman, Cellmark Report Blog Post, supra note 52.
111. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2255 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
113. Id at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2229 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 2229-32.
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what is obvious on the face of the report itself. It is on Cellmark's
letterhead, dated, titled "Report of Laboratory Examination," addressed to a
recipient at the Forensic Science Center of the ISP in Chicago, and signed
by two laboratory directors who recite their titles."'6 It bears two case
numbers (apparently one for Cellmark and one for the ISP, the submitting
agency).'1 7 It refers to the "exhibits received" and then to the disposition of
"evidence.""' 8 That sounds pretty formal to me. So why was it not formal
enough for Justice Thomas?
He said that the report "lacks the solemnity of an affidavit or
deposition, for it is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact."" 9
But from the beginning, Crawford established that this fact in itself does not
make a statement non-testimonial. 20 Such a rule would make no sense,
because a jurisdiction could virtually nullify the Confrontation Clause by
the simple expedient of taking testimony without the protection of an oath.
Moreover, given that two directors signed the report, one might
wonder what was missing; it appears that if the signatures had been under
the word "Certifier" rather than the word "Reviewer," Justice Thomas
would have regarded the report as sufficiently formal to be testimonial, and
the outcome of the case would have changed.121
But to Justice Thomas, the particular words chosen have great
significance. "Nowhere," he wrote, "does the report attest that its
statements accurately reflect the DNA testing processes used or the results
obtained." 22 I am dubious. Presumably, Cellmark-and the two reviewing
directors-intended their work to be taken seriously and to be regarded as
accurate. I would think the signatures amount to an assertion of the truth of
the contents of the report. Between the assertion, "X is true" and a
statement "I attest X is true," I wonder if there is even what Justice Kagan,
in dissent, characterized as "a nickel's worth of difference." 2 3
Justice Thomas did, however, have a substantive point in mind. The
signatories, he wrote, "neither purport to have performed the DNA testing
nor certify the accuracy of those who did." 2 4 He is certainly right that the
signatories did not purport to have performed the tests.12 5 On the face of the
report, one might also believe he is right that the signatures have a more
116. Friedman, Cellmark Report Blog Post, supra note 52 (quoting CELLMARK DIAGNOSTICS,
REPORT OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION 1 (Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter CELLMARK REPORT], available
at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-rdfrdman/CellmarkRpt3.pdf).
117. Id.
118. Id (quoting CELLMARK REPORT, supra note 116, at 1).
119. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004).
121. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 2276 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. See id.
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limited meaning than an assertion, "The results reported here are accurate";
it might appear that they mean only, "This report is in proper form, and I
have no reason to doubt that the tests were performed properly."l 26 Taken
in context, however, it appears rather clear that the signatures represent an
assertion of accuracy.127
But even if Justice Thomas were correct in perceiving limited meaning
to the signatures, how could that excuse a confrontation problem? If the
signatories did not perform the tests or write the body of the report or assert
its accuracy, that means that someone else at Cellmark did so, presumably
in full knowledge that reviewers at Cellmark would sign it and send it back
to the state police, clearly in contemplation of its eventual use in
prosecution. It would be unfortunate if Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming-in
both of which Justice Thomas joined, providing a crucial fifth vote' 2 8 -
could be rendered dead letters quite so easily: One analyst performs the test
and writes the report, and another signs it. Indeed, if the report in Williams
is outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause-even though those who
prepared the body of the report understood its eventual prosecutorial use-
because they did not sign it, attest to its accuracy, or even make their
identities known, it is difficult to see why the Clause would ever have real
force: government officials or other evidence gatherers could simply take
statements from witnesses and tack on a covering statement to the effect
that the evidence presented is an accurate reflection of the statement made.
Or perhaps they would not even need that tack-on, so long as the statement
was presented informally and someone could authenticate it.
Justice Thomas suggested that such a tactic is not constitutionally
troublesome, because to invoke it the prosecution must present a
126. See id.
127. Section 21034(b) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-
322, which is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) and is part of what is referred to as the DNA
Identification Act, provides that, in order to submit DNA profiles to the National DNA Index System, a
laboratory must comply with quality assurance standards issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Cellmark's corporate parent affirms, "Our offender profiles are generated following the strict acceptance
standards required for upload to the FBI's Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)." Forensic DNA:
Offender Testing, ORCHID CELLMARK, http://www.orchidcellmark.com/forensicdna/offendertesting.html
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012). Those standards, Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing
Laboratories, FBI: LABORATORY SERVICES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/qas-
standards-for-forensic-dna-testing-laboratories-effective-9-1-2011, contain numerous provisions indica-
ting the formality of reports submitting such profiles. See, e.g., Standard 11.1 ("The laboratory shall
have and follow written procedures for taking and maintaining casework notes to support the
conclusions drawn in laboratory reports."). These include an extensive set of "elements" that the report
must contain. Standard 11.2. One of these, Standard 11.2.9, is "[a] signature and title, or equivalent
identification, of the person accepting responsibility for the content of the report." This requirement has
been in the Standards since at least 1998. DNA Advisory Board, Quality Assurance Standards for
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (1998), http://www.bioforensics.com/conferenceO4/TWGDAM/
QualityAssurance Standards_2.pdf.
128. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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denigrated, and therefore less persuasive, form of evidence.12 9 But I believe
that argument is very weak. The Confrontation Clause guarantees the
accused a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him--not a right
to point out to the jury that a witness is testifying against him anonymously
or without subjecting herself to the oath and confrontation.o3 0
Apparently recognizing the need to incorporate a safety valve into his
formality test, Justice Thomas asserted here, as he did in Davis, that the
Confrontation Clause "reaches the use of technically informal statements
when used to evade the formalized process."'3 ' Given that one making a
statement in contemplation of litigation always has a choice of whether to
make the statement more or less formal, it is hard to know how this
standard should apply; one could argue that any time a less formal process
is used it reflects a decision to avoid a more formalized one. Assuming that
argument is rejected, a multitude of ambiguities remains. Suppose a
jurisdiction now requires certification of forensic lab reports in a manner
that even Justice Thomas would recognize makes the reports formal. And
suppose further that in light of Williams the jurisdiction decides to require
certification no longer. Would that constitute evasion? Would we have to
read the minds of the legislature? In Hammon, after Amy Hammon made
her oral accusation, which became the subject of the Supreme Court case,
she swore out an affidavit, presumably formal even in Justice Thomas's
view.13 2 Was the informal statement not an evasion of the "formalized
process" because it was immediately followed by that process? (I might
have thought it was part of that process.) If so, perhaps this means that
evidence gatherers have a sure way around the Confrontation Clause: take
an informal statement and then a formal one; the latter cannot be used at
trial absent confrontation, but it prevents the former from appearing
evasive. I hope that is too bizarre a doctrine to be adopted.
In his path-breaking concurrence in White, Justice Thomas rejected a
test of the scope of the Confrontation Clause based on whether the
statement was made in contemplation of legal proceedings.' 33 His principal
reason was that such a standard would be too difficult to apply.134 It is time
to recognize that a formality standard raises no fewer problems of
application. But it is headed in the wrong direction from the start, and so
129. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2261. The Solicitor General's Office made a similar argument in
Williams. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-50, Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (No. 10-85051) (argument of
Michael Dreeben).
130. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
131. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 n.5 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). He repeated the point later in the opinion,
saying that "the Confrontation Clause reaches bad-faith attempts to evade the formalized process." Id.
at 2261.
132. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 820.
133. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 364.
2012] 67
TEXAS TECH LAWREVIEW
those problems are not the ordinary ones of line drawing that virtually any
legal standard poses. Formality fails as a standard because, though
formality is essential for testimony to be acceptable, it is not the essence of
what makes a statement testimonial.
B. Used for the Truth of What It Asserted?
Even assuming--contrary to the votes of five Justices-that the
Cellmark report was testimonial in nature, it would not raise a problem
under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution used it for the truth
of one or more statements that it asserted.135 The Alito foursome believed
the report was not so used; the other five Justices disagreed.136
1. Sufficiently Conveyed?
I have referred to whether the statement was "used," rather than the
more usual "offered," for the truth of what it asserted, because the Cellmark
report was never introduced into evidence or even made part of the record
in the Illinois courts.' 37  So if it was not offered into evidence, could it
possibly create a confrontation problem?
Though the Cellmark report was not formally presented to the trial
judge, who sat as trier of fact, certainly Lambatos's testimony conveyed to
him some of the substance of the report. Lambatos made clear that the
report indicated that found on the swab was DNA with a profile meeting a
very definite criterion-it was such that both a computer program and
Lambatos herself determined that it matched Williams's DNA.'3 8 No other
evidence indicated what the profile of the DNA found on the swab was. 39
With respect to oral statements, it is clear that a verbatim repetition of
the statement, or even an attempt to quote it, is not necessary for the
Confrontation Clause to come into play.14 0  Indeed, a rule that made the
135. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 410-17 (1985).
136. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228, 2240-41; id. at 2264-77 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 2223.
139. See id.
140. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 811 (1990). In Idaho v. Wright, for example, the in-court
witness reported a conversation from notes that were "not detailed." Id The examination of the in-
court witness in Wright illustrates the summary nature of the testimony by which out-of-court
testimonial statements are often reported to the trier of fact:
"Q.... [W]hat was, as best you recollect, what was her response to the question 'Do you
play with daddy?'
"A. Yes, we play-I remember her making a comment about yes we play a lot and expanding
on that and talking about spending time with daddy.
"Q. And 'Does daddy play with you?' Was there any response?
"A. She responded to that as well, that they played together in a variety of
circumstances and, you know, seemed very unaffected by the question.
"Q. And then what did you say and her response?
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Clause inapplicable unless the exact oral statement was presented to the
trier of fact would make no sense and would render the Clause a virtual
nullity.141 And plainly out-of-court written statements should receive no
different treatment in this respect from oral statements. That is true as a
matter of principle: the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
that witnesses give their testimony in a prescribed manner, in the presence
of the accused, and subject to cross-examination.14 2  If a witness makes a
testimonial statement out of court and the substance of that statement is
presented to the trier of fact to prove the truth of the matter asserted and
without the accused having had an opportunity for confrontation, the Clause
is violated-and it makes no difference whether the witness made the
testimonial statement in writing or orally.143
"A. When I asked her 'Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee,' she did admit to that. When
I asked, 'Do you touch his pee-pee,' she did not have any response.
"Q. Excuse me. Did you notice any change in her affect or attitude in that line of
questioning?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What did you observe?
"A. She would not-oh, she did not talk any further about that. She would not elucidate
what exactly-what kind of touching was taking place, or how it was happening. She did,
however, say that daddy does do this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than
with me.
"Q. And how did she offer that last statement? Was that in response to a question or was
that just a volunteered statement?
"A. That was a volunteered statement as I sat and waited for her to respond, again after she
sort of clammed-up, and that was the next statement that she made after just allowing some
silence to occur."
Id. at 810-11; accord, e.g., Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2011). Even before
Crawford v. Washington, Supreme Court case law clearly established that "out-of-court
statements ... trigger[] the protections of the Confrontation Clause, even if the in-court testimony
described rather than quoted the out-of-court statements." See Ocampo, 649 F.3d at 1108 (citing
Wright, 497 U.S. at 811); State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 554 (Minn. 2010) (holding that a trial court
"violates the Confrontation Clause when it admits testimony that inescapably implies a nontestifying
witness's testimonial hearsay statement," even though the in-court witness does not "expressly state[]"
the out-of-court testimonial statement).
141. In most situations, the in-court witness is not able to quote an earlier testimonial statement
exactly. Moreover, even if she is able to do so, such a rule would provide an easy way to avoid the
Clause, simply by having the in-court witness offer a paraphrase or summary of the statement or, for that
matter, any other testimony from which the substance of the statement might be inferred. In United
States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011), for example, the prosecutor, recognizing that statements
made by a cooperating arrestee to law enforcement agents were testimonial, did not ask a testifying
agent what the arrestee said; instead, he secured the agent's testimony that after the interview "the
targets of [the] investigation changed" and that the accused was taken into federal detention. Id. at 11,
19. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit saw through this blatant ruse: "It makes no difference that
the government took care not to introduce [the out-of-court witness's] 'actual statements. . . .' [A]ny
other conclusion would permit the government to evade the limitations of the Sixth Amendment . .. by
weaving an unavailable declarant's statements into another witness's testimony by implication." Id. at
21-22.
142. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
143. See id. at 50-59.
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Furthermore, a bizarre consequence would follow if written
statements, unlike oral ones, could be made categorically exempt from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny through the simple expedient of an in-court
witness testifying to the substance of the statement. Any witness who made
an oral testimonial statement but did not want to confront the accused could
repeat the statement in writing. Another witness could then testify at trial to
the substance of the written statement, and the Clause would provide no
protection to the accused. Such a rule would, in fact, tend perversely to
denigrate the quality of the evidence offered at trial because prosecutors
would have an incentive to present their testimony in summary form.
Accordingly, formal admission of a statement, whether it was made orally
or in writing, cannot be necessary for the statement to fall within the scope
of the Confrontation Clause. 144
The Alito foursome did not deny the validity of this general argument,
which was presented to the Court in Williams.14 5 Nevertheless, a passage in
Justice Alito's opinion may be understood as contending that because the
report was not introduced, there could not be a Confrontation Clause
problem.14 6 Justice Alito wrote that the absence of any evidence that
Cellmark produced a reliable DNA profile from the vaginal swab would
pose a relevance problem, not a Confrontation Clause problem. 147  That
may be, but the problem is that Lambatos's testimony did convey that
Cellmark produced such a profile.14 8 The prosecution could not avoid a
confrontation problem by refraining to make a formal proffer of the report.
I am not sure the Alito foursome believes that it could; the other five
Justices clearly do not.
2. Support of the Expert's Opinion
Justice Alito put his principal reliance in this part of the case on the
nature of expert testimony. As he noted, expert witnesses have long been
allowed to testify to opinions without having personally observed all the
factual events or conditions on which the opinions are based.14 9 His initial
indication of the point, in the first paragraph of his opinion, is unnecessarily
tendentious: "[D]oes Crawford bar an expert from expressing an opinion
based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but
144. See id
145. It was presented by me, in an amicus brief from which the preceding paragraphs have been
adapted. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Williams v. Illinois,
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (No. 10-8505)
146. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2238 ("[I]t is .. . suggested that the State somehow introduced 'the
substance of Cellmark's report into evidence."' (quoting id. at 2268 (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 2227.
149. See id. at 2233-34.
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about which the expert is not competent to testify?",o No one in Williams
contended-and so far as I know, no one has ever seriously contended-
that the Confrontation Clause would require an affirmative answer to that
question.
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and its state counterparts regulate the
procedure governing the information on which experts base their
opinions.' 5 ' Rule 703 now provides the following:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert
has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in
forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Thus, according to Rule 703, an expert may testify to an opinion based on
information made known to her by one of the parties to the litigation, even
though that information is not admissible independently of the opinion.153
In some cases, the need to evaluate the opinion can shoehorn that
information into evidence.
Of course, Rule 703 did not apply to this case of its own force, and it
could not take priority over the Constitution, but a reader of Justice Alito's
opinion might infer that the Rule reflects a procedure that is two hundred
years old and so was presumably the one contemplated when the
Confrontation Clause was adopted. But that is not so. The Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 703, which was first enacted in 1975, makes clear
that there were two traditional sources of the information on which an
expert might base her opinion-"firsthand observation of the witness" and
"presentation at the trial," with the information transmitted to the expert
either through "the familiar hypothetical question" or by "having the expert
attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the facts." 54 And the
Advisory Committee Note makes equally clear that the third method that it
authorized was not one with deep historical roots:
The third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of data
to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception. In this
150. Id. at 2227.
151. See FED R. EVID. 703.
152. Id.
153. See id.; see also FED. R. EviD. 705 ("Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an
opinion-and give the reasons for it-without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the
expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.").
154. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions
beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice
into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court. 155
Thus, this aspect of Rule 703 does not reflect long-established historical
practice. It cannot be taken, as Justice Alito seems to suggest, as a
codification of principles governing the Confrontation Clause.15 6 It is,
rather, an innovation of the second half of the twentieth century, from a
time when modern Confrontation Clause doctrine was in its infancy; not
until 1965 did the Supreme Court hold that the Clause was binding on the
states,15 7 and it was only in 1980 that the Court attempted to articulate an
overall doctrine governing the Clause-the now-discredited approach of
Ohio v. Roberts.'15  Rule 703 provides no help whatsoever in interpreting
the Confrontation Clause.
That is not to say that this aspect of Rule 703 is always troublesome
when invoked by a prosecutor. If the expert has received information
through a non-testimonial statement-say, a routine blood-test report, not
prepared in contemplation of litigation-then there is no Confrontation
Clause problem. But if the statement was testimonial in nature-and this
part of the case becomes significant only if we assume that the Cellmark
report was-then the existence of Rule 703 cannot overcome a
Confrontation Clause objection.
Nevertheless, Justice Alito invokes the logic underlying this aspect of
Rule 703 to conclude that the Cellmark report was not used to prove the
truth of what it reported. 5 9 He goes to considerable length to establish that
under Illinois law, Lambatos's reference to the DNA profile "found in
semen from the vaginal swabs" was only a premise for her opinion of a
match, "not admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
asserted-i.e., . . . as substantive evidence to establish where the DNA
profiles" come;160 although he acknowledges that a jury might not
understand the difference, he insists that a trial judge can be expected to. 6 1
There are at least three problems with that argument in this case. First,
if a testimonial statement helps support the expert's opinion only if it is
true, then there is no distinction in substance between admitting the
155. Id.
156. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2226 (2012).
157. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 402-07 (1965).
158. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 56-60 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
159. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2224.
160. Id. at 2236.
161. Id.at2236-38.
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statement to prove the truth of what it asserts and admitting it in support of
the opinion.16 2 Justice Alito makes no real effort to counter this point.
Second, although Justice Alito was correct in saying that Lambatos's
testimony that the two profiles matched "was not in any way dependent on
the origin of the samples from which the profiles were derived,"l 63 he had
to acknowledge that without "evidence to establish the provenance of the
profiles," this opinion would have been devoid of probative value.'6 This
is not a case in which, say, a physician gives an opinion as to the medical
condition of a personal injury plaintiff based, in part, on information that is
not in itself admitted into evidence. In that setting, the witness has given an
opinion about a material fact that is within her field of expertise; plainly,
the opinion has probative value. In Williams, however, the opinion that a
given profile matched that of Sandy Williams would prove nothing
worthwhile at all absent proof tying that profile to the facts of the crime; it
would be about as effective as one hand clapping.
Third, Lambatos's testimony in fact provided that necessary missing
link, but it could not properly be used in that way. That is, the prosecution
needed proof of the provenance of the DNA profile reported by Cellmark,
and taking Lambatos's testimony at face value, she did transmit the essence
of Cellmark's account that it was reporting a profile that was derived
(accurately) from the vaginal swabs.16 5 But the theory endorsed by Justice
Alito required the trier of fact to put out of mind this aspect of Lambatos's
testimony-and if one put aside Lambatos's testimony there was no proof
of the provenance of the DNA profile.16 6
In the end, then, if we assume that the Cellmark report was testimonial
and that Lambatos's testimony conveyed part of the substance of the report
in a way tantamount to formal admission, that testimony raises a
Confrontation Clause problem notwithstanding the fact that the substance
so conveyed was a premise of an expert opinion. At least the arguments
analyzed so far do not relieve the prosecution of the need to prove missing
links-that the profile reported by Cellmark was derived from the vaginal
swabs taken from L.J. and that this was done accurately.
162. See id. at 2258 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2268-69 (Kagan, J., dissenting); People v.
Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y. 2005) (holding, in a case in which testimonial statements
could buttress expert's opinion only if true, that "[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its
truth and a statement offered to shed light on an expert's opinion is not meaningful in this context");
People v. Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 270-75 (2011) (reviewing cases and academic literature, and
characterizing Goldstein's logic as "compelling").
163. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2239 (plurality opinion).
164. Id.
165. Seeid.at2239.
166. Seeid.at2241.
2012] 73
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
3. No Plausible Alternative Explanation
The principal point on which Justice Alito relied in filling in the
missing links was one to which he referred repeatedly in the opinion, the
prominence he gave to it suggesting that it may have been decisive for at
least one member of the plurality. In this case, the chance that the lab
report resulted from any process other than accurate analysis of Williams's
DNA appears to have been very small, and without regard to whether the
proficiency of the lab or those who performed the test and reported on it.' 67
In Melendez-Diaz, Briscoe, and Bullcoming, the questions were how
much, if any, of a bad factor (cocaine in the first two cases, blood alcohol in
the last) was present in a given sample; the presence, and an elevated level,
of that factor would help the prosecution."' It would, therefore, be
perfectly plausible that laziness or incompetence on the part of the analyst
could yield an inaccurate report of results helpful to the prosecution.
Moreover, the analyst would presumably know what answers would help
the prosecution-"Yes, and a lot," in effect-so dishonesty as well could
produce such inaccuracy.
In Williams, by contrast, the chance that Cellmark would by chance
come up with a DNA profile that would help the prosecution of any
defendant would be very small.'69 Not only would the chance process have
to yield the DNA profile of an actual man, but to make a prosecution viable,
that man would presumably have to live in, or at least have contact with, the
vicinity of the crime. Moreover, the real question, I believe, is how
probable chance error would yield a DNA profile matching that of Sandy
Williams,170 against whom there was, in the end, significant other evidence.
(Recall that L.J. identified Williams, though the identification was shaky.)
That chance was infinitesimally small.
Furthermore, at the time that Cellmark performed the test, it appears
that there was no way that anybody at the lab could have known what
profile would help the prosecution. Recall that Williams was not a suspect
at that time, and so far as it appears, Cellmark could not have had
knowledge of his profile. '' Accordingly, a dishonest analyst eager to help
the prosecution would not know what profile to report.
My point is not that the Cellmark report is reliable; if Crawford is
clear on one matter, it is that the reliability of a testimonial statement does
not satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns. Rather, the point is that the fact
that the Cellmark report contained a given DNA profile is highly probative
167. Seeidat2238.
168. See discussion supra notes 16-36.
169. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2237-38, 2239, 2244.
170. See generally Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption ofScientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REv. 931 (1999).
171. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.
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in the prosecution of Williams without reference to the credibility of the
analysts who authored the report. The report might have significant
probative value even if it is considered not as a truthful relation of what it
asserts-the only basis on which it would raise a Confrontation Clause
concern-but rather as a phenomenon that could plausibly have arisen only
in one way.
To see this point, it may help to consider an old, non-DNA case,
Bridges v. State.172 Bridges was accused of molesting a young girl,
Sharon.' 3 Sharon made a statement to her mother describing the apartment
where the incident occurred.' 7 4 The description closely matched that of
Bridges's apartment.'75 Assume that, taken in conjunction, the set of
features that Sharon described was highly unusual. Assume also that she
did not testify at trial and that there was no reason to suspect that she was in
the apartment on any occasion other than the one in question. The
statement might appear to be offered for the truth of what it asserts-that
Sharon was in (and molested in) a room meeting the description that she
stated. But now suppose that instead of stating that she was in a room of
that description, she came home from school with a story she wrote
featuring such a room. Clearly, the story is not offered for the truth of what
it asserts, on the basis that Sharon is a reliable reporter. And yet, if the
description is sufficiently odd, but matches the accused's apartment, it has
substantial probative value. Given that Sharon was not in the apartment on
any other occasion, the fact that she put together the unusual conjunction of
features may be powerful evidence that she was in the apartment on the
occasion in question--even if she is not regarded as a reliable witness.
How does this tie in to a DNA case like Williams? Suppose (1) a
crime scene sample is sent to a lab; (2) the lab sends back a piece of paper
bearing the case number for that sample and a set of numbers that, it turns
out, match the DNA profile of a given person; (3) the lab was not given that
person's DNA profile; and (4) there is substantial other evidence suggesting
that that person left DNA in the crime scene sample. I believe all of these
facts were true in Williams. In these circumstances, the prosecution has at
least a plausible argument that it should be allowed to follow the same sort
of logic I have suggested in conjunction with Bridges-that is, that it should
be allowed to present that piece of paper and say, in effect, "I'm not asking
you to rely on the proficiency of this lab. But there is no plausible way in
these circumstances that the lab could have come up with those numbers
unless Accused left his DNA in the crime scene sample and the lab did an
accurate DNA test on the sample."
172. See Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Wis. 1945); Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of
Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 682-83 (1987) (analyzing Bridges).
173. Bridges, 19 N.W.2d at 530.
174. Id. at 531.
175. Id. at 530-31.
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The logic here is not airtight; it is possible that somehow Cellmark got
a sample containing Williams's DNA and somehow mixed it up with the
vaginal swab from L.J., therefore reporting a profile matching Williams's,
even though his DNA was not on the swab. But it is also possible that
Sharon was in Bridges's apartment on some occasion other than the one in
question. In each case the possibility, though conceivable, appears highly
unlikely. In each case, the bare possibility is not in itself a sufficient reason
to exclude the evidence. It appears more appropriate to cast the burden on
the defense to demonstrate that what appears to have been highly
improbable is true, or simply to allow the defense to argue on the basis of
the possibility and let it go to the weight of the evidence.
This argument suggests a way in which DNA results might be
presented in a case like Williams, consistently with Confrontation Clause
principles, without the need for a witness from the lab that performed the
test. But doing so does not allow reliance on the laboratory as a reliable
tester and reporter. The prosecution cannot say, in effect-as it did in
Williams-"We sent the sample to the lab. They are very good at doing
DNA tests and reporting on the results, and that is what they did with this
sample. Accordingly, their report very reliably indicates the profile of
DNA that was found in the sample." Rather, the prosecution's account
must be on the order of, "We sent the sample to the lab. They sent back a
report with numbers on it, and those match with the accused's DNA profile.
Given that the lab had no access to that profile, and given the
extraordinarily small probability that any process other than performing a
DNA test on material from the accused would produce those numbers, the
only plausible conclusion is that material from the accused was in fact in
the sample."
Furthermore, admitting the evidence on this basis would affect the
probative value of the DNA evidence by expanding the set of alternative
accounts that could explain that evidence. Suppose a witness from
Cellmark had testified at trial and related from firsthand knowledge
everything that happened with respect to the swabs from the time Cellmark
received them to the time that it sent its report. Assuming the trier of fact
believed this testimony, and also accepted Lambatos's testimony that the
profile matched that of Williams, then the only possible hypothesis other
than that Williams's DNA was on the swab would be that some other man
with a matching profile left his DNA on the swab. But if what the trier
learns is that the ISP sent the swabs to Cellmark and received back a piece
of paper bearing numbers that constitute a DNA profile matching
Williams's, a broader range of possibilities is open as well. It could be that
those numbers result from the testing of a sample other than the vaginal
swabs that somehow got mixed up with the swabs. Or perhaps someone at
the ISP with knowledge of Williams's profile conspired with someone at
Cellmark to frame Williams. And it is mathematically possible, though
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extremely unlikely, that the numbers were generated by some process other
than DNA testing.
Ultimately, then, I do not believe that the "no plausible alternative
explanation" argument justifies the result in Williams, though it might have
justified admissibility if the evidence had been presented differently.
Certainly, one can understand why Justice Alito referred to this factor three
times; it comes closer than any other to providing an arguable justification
for the result.
C. Cost Considerations
In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the dissenters expressed concern
that the costs of requiring live testimony by lab analysts would be
intolerable.17 6  It is hard to escape the conclusion that the same concern
motivated the same four Justices in Williams. In the first paragraph of his
opinion, Justice Alito makes this remarkable statement: "We ... decide
whether Crawford substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to
introduce DNA evidence and thus may effectively relegate the prosecution
in some cases to reliance on older, less reliable forms of proof."77
To which my response is, Oh, come on, really. Though the foursome
have repeatedly made predictions of looming disaster if a Confrontation
Clause claim with respect to lab reports were upheld,17 8 they seem
persistently unwilling to grapple with the facts demonstrating that their
concern is vastly overblown. As in Melendez-Diaz, "[p]erhaps the best
indication that the sky [would] not fall [if Williams won] is that it has not
done so already," though many states require lab analysts to testify live.' 79
One might be concerned that the problem is worse with respect to
DNA evidence than with respect to tests for the presence of drugs or of
blood alcohol content because DNA tests are more complex and are often
performed by more than one person. Indeed, both Justice Alito's opinion
and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion indicate that the brief of the New
York County District Attorney's Office and the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner of New York Cityso had considerable impact in persuading some
of the Justices that victory for Williams would require a parade of lab
witnesses in order for the prosecution to introduce any DNA results; Justice
Breyer speaks of "the additional cost and complexity involved in requiring
176. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 340-52 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723-28 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
178. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 352-57.
179. Id. at 325-26 (majority opinion).
180. Brief of Amicus Curiae New York County District Attorney's Office and the New York City
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Support of Respondent, Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (No. 10-
8505) [hereinafter New York Amicus Briefj.
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live testimony from perhaps dozens of ordinary laboratory technicians."181
But that is just fanciful. In connection with Bullcoming, I supervised a
study of Michigan trials in which DNA evidence was presented. Michigan
is one of those states that, before Melendez-Diaz, required live testimony
from reporting lab analysts; Michigan defendants rarely raise a serious
objection to procedures used by the prosecution.'82 We found that in rape
cases in which DNA results were presented, an average of 1.24 lab
witnesses per trial testified live to present those results.'83  That is a very
short parade.
Several factors account for the fact that the reality is so much less
burdensome than the dire pictures painted by those resisting the
confrontation rights of defendants with respect to DNA tests.184
(1) Justice Breyer took a lead from the New York Amicus Brief, which
characterized the position of those supporting Williams as advocating an
"all-technicians-must-testify" rule.'85 This was simply wrong.
Bear in mind that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial
statements that are presented in some manner to the trier of fact. So
consider the stages of DNA analysis discussed in the New York Amicus
Brief.'86
(a) Examination: A technician "examines the sample ... and takes
cuttings for DNA extraction."' 87 There is no testimonial statement there-
examining and cutting do not constitute a statement.
(b) Extraction: A technician adds reagents to the sample.'88 Again, no
statement.
181. Id. at 2244 (plurality opinion); id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
182. See Richard D. Friedman, Is There a Multi-Witness Problem with Respect to Forensic Lab
Tests?, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
2010/12/is-there -multi-witness-problem-with.html.
183. Id.
184. Much of this discussion is taken from a blog post, Thoughts on the Brief of the New York DA
and OCME in Williams. See Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on the Brief of the New York DA and
OCME in Williams (Dec. 5, 2011), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/12/thoughts-on-brief-of-
new-york-da-and.html.
185. See New York Amicus Brief, supra note 180, at 10; accord Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that there is "no logical stopping place" between requiring none of the
lab technicians to testify and requiring all of them to do so).
Justice Breyer in Williams v. Illinois also adopted one of the more extravagant suggestions in the
New York brief-that victory for Williams would cause some jurisdictions to reduce the amount of
DNA testing they conduct. See New York Amicus Brief, supra note 180, at 10. But neither Justice
Breyer nor the New York Brief offers any basis for concluding that states that require reporting DNA
analysts to testify live rely on DNA evidence less than states that do not. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at
2251. Nor do they offer any reason to believe that a result contrary to the one in Williams would
diminish the authorities' desire to identify the actual assailant or the ability of DNA testing to do that.
Id.
186. See New York Amicus Brief, supra note 180, at 7.
187. See id
188. See id
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(c) Quantitation: A technician measures the amount of DNA. 189
Presumably this technician reports on that amount. But even assuming that
this report is a testimonial statement, there is no need for it to be presented
to the trier of fact. The witness who reports on the profile found in the latter
part of the process does not have to convey to the trier of fact, or even rely
in her own testimony, on the results of this stage; we know from the fact
that a DNA profile was ultimately found that there was enough DNA to
perform the analysis.190
(d) Amplification: A technician copies specific portions of the DNA to
raise them to sufficient levels for testing.1 91 Again, this is not a statement.
(e) Electrophoresis: Here at last we have the performance of the test
that matters. A technician who performs this test must report on the
results.19 2 That report, in a case in which the test is clearly performed for
forensic purposes, should be regarded as a testimonial statement, and it
provides the essential information that the prosecution needs.
So even if Williams had won and some labs continued to adhere to the
procedure described by the New York Amicus Brief, the Confrontation
Clause would say nothing about most of the technicians involved in that
procedure.193
I have not said anything in this context about chain of custody. So
long as a witness speaks only about what she knows from personal
knowledge, chain of custody is not a confrontation problem per se.
Melendez-Diaz makes clear that as an initial matter, it is up to the
prosecution to decide what witness's statements it wishes to present to
establish the chain of custody.194 If the gaps in the chain are too great, there
may be insufficient proof, and at some point, that could be a due process
violation. But reasonable inferences can bridge some substantial gaps.1 9s
(2) Given modem DNA techniques, retesting is virtually always a
possibility. Neither any Justice nor anyone on the State side in Williams
gave any reason to suggest that it would not be routinely possible in a case
like Williams. Only a small minority of cases go to trial; in a given case, if
the original technician could not conveniently testify at trial, a technician
better placed to do so could retest the sample without adding great expense.
I89. See id.
190. See Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, supra note 25, at 434.
191. See New York Amicus Brief, supra note 180, at 7.
192. See id.
193. If Williams had won this case, I do not believe that the signatories to the New York Amicus
Brief would then proclaim that all the technicians in this procedure would have to testify.
194. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009).
195. Obviously, during such gaps the sample would change naturally over time in at least some
respects, and this would not make proof of the chain of custody inadequate. Moreover, I do not believe
that the sample needs to have been sitting still during the gaps; technicians may have performed some
procedures without rendering the chain of custody inadequate.
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(3) The Sixth Amendment does not incorporate the Cellmark protocol.
Much of the New York Amicus Brief, like Justice Breyer's opinion, reads
as if Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must take as given the procedures
such as those used by Cellmark in Williams. But other labs use different
procedures. Note, for example, that only one technician from the Illinois
State Police Lab did the test on the blood sample taken from Williams-and
she testified at trial.1 96 The Michigan State Police Lab rarely involves more
than three people in a given lab test. 97
Of course, such vertically integrated procedures might not be as
efficient as those used by Cellmark. But it appears clear that the Cellmark
procedures were designed with little regard to the confrontation rights of the
accused. It is hardly surprising that procedures designed without that
constraint would be more efficient than procedures subject to it.
Neither any Justice nor anyone on the State side has suggested any
reason why states that do not already operate under more vertically
integrated procedures cannot emulate states that do.
(4) Defense counsel often stipulate to the results of DNA tests; often,
they recognize that their chances of securing an acquittal will not be
improved by drawing the attention of the trier of fact to an aspect of the
prosecution case that might appear overwhelmingly strong. True, counsel
may sometimes decline to stipulate until confident that the State will in fact
produce all necessary witnesses, but states that have fully protected
confrontation rights have not found this to be an insuperable burden. Why
not? Often counsel realizes this tactic is more likely to do harm than good.
For example, they may recognize from experience that the prosecution will
do whatever it takes to ensure that any necessary lab witnesses appear. And
often they understand that their chance of reaching an acceptable plea
bargain will be substantially impaired if they are perceived as game-playing
in hopes of imposing costs on the prosecution.'"
Trying a criminal defendant is, no doubt, more expensive in a system
that gives him a right to demand that the witnesses against him testify face-
to-face than in other systems that could be devised. But if a lab technician
performs a test and writes a report on it, knowing that it is likely to be used
in prosecution, and before the accused is convicted of a serious crime that
technician is required to testify live rather than simply mail the report in,
this does not strike me as a terrible result. Nor does such a requirement cast
an intolerable burden on a criminal justice system.
196. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2011).
197. See Richard D. Friedman, Michigan-A State That Does It Right, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Jan.
20, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/01/michigan-state-that-does-it-right.
html; Interview with John Collins, Director, Michigan State Police Crime Laboratory (Jan. 2011).
198. In his Melendez-Diaz dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that it would be unprofessional for
counsel to waive a client's rights for fear of incurring judicial displeasure. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at
330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). I am putting aside the possibility that counsel would act in that way.
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III. WHAT IS THE HOLDING?
That the Williams Court was so splintered makes it difficult to
determine what the holding was. The conventional wisdom is that, given
the lack of a majority opinion, the holding of the Court is the narrowest
theory supporting the judgment articulated by any of the Justices.19 That
approach strikes me as misguided. If one group of three Justices in a six-
member majority says the result should prevail in circumstances A and B,
and another says it should prevail in circumstances B and C, who is to say
which is narrower? In Williams, it is tempting to say that Justice Thomas's
opinion stated a narrower theory than Justice Alito's. 200 But if Justice
Thomas's view of what is required to make a statement formal applies
across the board, not just with respect to lab tests-and nothing he said
suggests such a limitation-then it might be considered stunningly broad.
I think a more fruitful approach is to ask: In what set of circumstances
do the principles adopted by at least five Justices lead to a result like the
one in the present case? Obviously they do at least in that case itself, but
presumably the principles apply more broadly than that. In the schematic
example given above, the holding would clearly be that the result should
prevail in set B.
In Williams, I believe all we can say is that five Justices hold that there
is no Confrontation Clause violation when (1) an expert compares two
DNA profiles, one from a crime scene sample and the other known to come
from a given person, and declares that they match (or that there is a very
small probability that such two samples not coming from a common source
would yield such similar profiles); (2) one of the profiles was generated by
a laboratory that had no access to the DNA profile of that person, and at a
time when neither the laboratory nor the authorities had any reason to tie
that person to the crime; and (3) the report of that profile was not sworn or
certified (according to standards determined by Justice Thomas).20 1
At the same time, however, it appears that five Justices are steadfast in
maintaining the holdings of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming; in rejecting a
test limiting testimonial statements to those that accuse a targeted
individual; in recognizing that a statement not formally admitted into
evidence may yet raise Confrontation Clause concerns if its substance is
conveyed to the trier of fact and it is used to prove the truth of the matter
that it asserts; in realizing that if a statement supports an opinion only if it is
199. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that "the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
200. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227; Jeffrey Fisher, The Holdings and Implications of Williams v.
Illinois, SCOTUS BLOG (June 20, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-holdings-
and-implications-of-williams-v-illinois/.
201. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2012] 81
TEXAS TECH LAWREVIEW
true, then the Clause cannot be avoided by holding that the statement is
being admitted in support of the opinion rather than for its truth; and in
refusing to be frightened from applying the confrontation right to its full
extent by unjustified fears that doing so would cause the criminal justice
system to break down.
It will be interesting to see what happens if, in a case similar to
Williams, the defendant, being forewarned by Justice Thomas's opinion,
demonstrates that one who signs the report accepts responsibility for it.2 02
In any event, it seems almost certain that before very long, the Supreme
Court will hold round five in the battle over the Confrontation Clause
implications of forensic lab reports.
202. See id.; see supra note 127.
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